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ABSTRACT 
 
We explore empirically the determinants of labor shares focusing on the role of investment. 
We use a cross-country framework and consider up to 99 countries for the period 2004-2015. 
Our results reveal that the level of a country’s investment is a significant driving factor of the 
labor share of income. This evidence is in line with the predictions of neoclassical mechanisms 
for the role of investment in labor share. Among several other factors that we consider, as 
suggested by the extant empirical literature, we find strong evidence only for the degree of a 
country’s exposure to the international financial system, which is inversely related to the labor 
shares. Moreover, economic freedom amplifies the positive effect of gross fixed capital 
formation on labor income shares. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of Kaldor’s (1957) ‘stylized facts’ is the constancy of the income distribution between the 
two key factors of production, capital and labor. The reported decline in the labor share of 
income since the early 1980s (see, for example, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Elsby et al., 
2013), however, has challenged this perception and renewed the interest in the factor shares. 
The declining amount of income accruing to labor translates to rising income inequality on the 
premise that profits are less equally distributed than wages (Piketty, 2014). Jacobson and 
Occhino (2012), in fact, provide numerical estimates for the increase in the US Gini index 
attributed to the decline in labor income share. Atkinson (2009) advocates the importance of 
studying factor shares drawing upon arguments about interpersonal income inequality, social 
justice and the proper tax-treatment of different sources of income. Against this background 
several attempts have been made to empirically establish the determinants of the labor share of 
income (see, among others, Stockhammer, 2017 and Furceri and Loungani, 2018). Lawrence 
(2015) offers an alternative explanation of the declining labor income share, relying on 
neoclassical considerations. Lawrence (2015) shows that in the US, the combination of a 
relatively low elasticity of substitution between capital and labor ( < 1) and “labor 
augmenting” technical change can explain the declining labor-capital ratio. One implication is 
that higher capital formation will raise labor income shares. Laurence (2015) uses sectoral data 
from the US to show that low elasticities of substitution and the decline in the effective capital-
labor ratio can account for much of the decline in labor's share in the US. In the neoclassical 
paradigm, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor determines the way in which 
income is distributed between the two factors of production.1 Thus, under specific assumptions 
about the elasticities between capital and labor of different skill levels, technological 
innovations that are capital-augmenting (i.e., the marginal product of capital is higher than the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Lawrence (2015) for a detailed description.  
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marginal product of labor) induce firms to substitute labor with capital, and the labor’s share 
of income falls. Guerriero and Sen (2012) provide evidence on the relationship between 
investment and the functional distribution of income, and report, for some of the specifications 
employed, a “puzzling” positive relationship for the developing countries. 
The present paper produces international evidence to characterize empirically the 
implications of capital formation for the total amount of income accruing to labor. We provide 
panel estimations of labor share growth on investment and on a set of theoretically motivated 
control variables that emerge in the literature as important determinants of income’s functional 
distribution between labor and capital. The control variables aim to capture technological 
change, real and financial globalization, the size of welfare state, workers’ bargaining power 
and human capital. We use a panel framework that includes up to 99 countries, advanced and 
emerging, covering the period from 2004-2015.  
The existing empirical evidence on the role of technology in labor share decline is 
mixed. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), for instance, use calibration methods and find that 
the higher capital-labor ratios, as a consequence of technologically-induced lower relative 
investment prices, account for almost half of the decline in labor income share. IMF (2007) 
using data from 18 OECD countries also provides empirical evidence showing that the effects 
of technological progress on the labor share can be negative. Stockhammer (2017), on the 
contrary, does not find evidence that technological change, measured by the logarithm of the 
GDP per worker, is an important factor driving labor shares. Instead, a small positive impact 
of technological change on the labor income share emerges in developing countries. Guerriero 
and Sen (2012) report a positive relationship between technology, proxied either by the number 
of patent applications or the expenses on research and development (R&D), and labor share. 
The level of workers’ educational attainment is customarily considered an important 
moderating factor for the relationship between technological progress and labor’s income 
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share. Skilled labor is commonly considered to exhibit lower substitutability/complementarity 
with capital (Elsby et al., 2013; Lawrence, 2015). This motivates the inclusion of human capital 
as a factor that might explain the functional distribution of income. Existing evidence from 
Guerriero and Sen (2012) suggests that human capital, proxied by the number of years in 
schooling, increases labor income share only in OECD economies, while it does not seem to 
be a significant factor for the developing ones. 
Another factor, which might account for the recent decline in labor’s share of output is 
the deterioration of labor’s bargaining power compared to capital. For example, Guschanski 
and Özlem (2018) in addition to the role of technological change, consider workers’ bargaining 
power and globalization. The globalization argument suggests that the bargaining power of 
employees is thwarted by higher real and financial integration with the world. Focusing on the 
role of trade openness, the empirical evidence on this matter is mixed. There is, for instance, 
cross-country empirical evidence that trade openness is associated with lower labor income 
share (Harrison, 2005; Dünhaupt, 2017). Nevertheless, Guerriero and Sen (2012) in their cross-
country study using data from 89 countries find a positive relationship between trade openness 
and labor share, especially for developing countries.  
An extant literature also focuses on the impact of financial globalization on labor 
income shares. Elsby et al. (2013), for example, identifies offshoring to be the most reliable 
explanation for the reported decline in the US labor income share. The literature employs 
several proxies for a country’s degree of financial integration. Furceri and Loungani (2018) 
use a de jure measure of capital account openness, Jayadev (2007) constructs an index 
measuring capital account openness, Stockhammer (2017) uses the total amount of foreign 
assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP, and Guerriero and Sen (2012) use the FDI inflows. 
Regardless of the measure employed, these studies show that financial globalization reduces 
the amount of income accruing to labor.   
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Finally, unionization and labor market institutions are also confounding factors that 
might influence the bargaining power of labor, and, thus, its share of income. Elsby et al. (2013) 
claim that the impact of unions on the labor share is ambiguous, however, there is empirical 
evidence suggesting otherwise. Fichtenbaum (2009) finds that union density is positively 
related with the labor income share in the US manufacturing industry. Stockhammer (2017), 
focusing on OECD economies, obtains a similar positive relationship. Earlier studies on the 
determinants of labor income share also consider the effects of the size of government spending 
as a percentage of GDP. Stockhammer (2017) interprets this variable as a measure of welfare 
state, while Harrison (2005) and Jayadev (2007) treat it as a control for the importance of the 
government in the economy. An emerging consensus is that government spending tends to have 
a positive impact on labor share.     
Lawrence (2015) uses data from the US manufacturing, mining, and IT sectors to 
develop an alternative explanation for the decline in labor income share. His analysis suggests 
that the decreasing labor share in the US is not due to the relative slower growth in wages. 
Instead, it is due to a combination of insufficient capital formation and labor-augmenting 
technology which leads to lower effective capital-labor ratios. This increase in the supply of 
‘effective labor’, in turn, under gross complentarity between labor and capital in the sectors 
under consideration leads to lower labor shares. 
This paper probes further into this literature that attempts to identify empirically the 
drivers of labor income shares focusing on the role of investment. We consider several of the 
control variables used in the most recent literature on the determination of labor income share, 
including workers’ bargaining power and globalization. In addition, we consider the impact on 
labor shares of variables measuring a country’s capital formation and R&D expenses. 
Moreover, we do not only investigate the link between capital formation and labor income 
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share covering more recent data, but also we seek to identify the magnitude of this relationship 
for varying levels of countries’ income and economic freedom.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section, describes the 
empirical methods and specifications employed, the variables, and data sources Section 3, 
presents and discusses the estimation results, and, finally, Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
This section describes the empirical strategy and the data used to identify the drivers of labor 
income share. The measurement of labor income share is subject to error because of difficulties 
in accurately measuring the income accruing to labor from self-employed activities (see, for 
example, Gollin, 2002 and Karabarbounis and Neinman, 2014). The difficulties lie in fact that 
compensation from self-employment combines labor and capital income, and there is no 
accurate way to measure the exact amount accruing to each factor of production. To circumvent 
complications with the accurate measurement of self-employment wages, Karabarbounis and 
Neiman (2014) focus only on the part of income earned in the corporate sector. The ILO, which 
publishes a comprehensive dataset of countries’ labor share, uses imputed self-employed wages 
based on worker’s common characteristics in order to account for this part of income. In this 
paper, we use the ILO measure for labor income share, which is available for the period 2004-
2017.  
We further adjust the total labor income share by excluding compensation from the 
government following the method proposed by Stockhammer (2017). Thus, we obtain private 
labor income share for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 (that is,  𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑝
) using the following relationship 𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑝 =
(𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝐶𝑖,𝑡)/(1 − 𝐺𝐶𝑖,𝑡), where 𝐺𝐶 stands for government consumption. Karabarbounis 
and Neiman (2014) also do not account for the government labor share justifying that based on 
difficulties pinning down the optimization problem of the government’s production function.  
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To obtain economically meaningful proxies for the impact of investment on countries’ 
labor share, we need to control for the various factors that theoretically influence the amount 
of income accruing to labor. To ensure the comparability of our results and provide robust 
estimates for the impact of investment, we choose control variables for our empirical 
estimations drawn from existing literature (e.g., Stockhammer, 2017; IMF, 2007). Thus, we 
consider variables capturing globalization, both financial (𝐹𝐼𝑁) and of the real economy 
(𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸). Moreover, we include real GDP growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻), technological change (𝐼𝐶𝑇), 
human capital (𝐻𝐶), union density (𝑈𝐷), and the size of the welfare state (𝐺𝐶).  
We use the following fixed-effects panel regression model as our baseline specification: 
 
Δ𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑝 = 𝛼1 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,        (1) 
 
where i indexes for country and t for year. The constant 𝜏𝑡 captures the time-specific effects. 
The (log) of the initial value of private labor income share (𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡=0
𝑝
), included in vector Z, 
captures the country-specific effects, since the initial differences in the private labor shares 
capture the differences in the time-invariant specific conditions of each country in the sample.  
Similar panel fixed-effects estimators that allow controlling for inter-country differences in 
labor income shares as well as time fixed-effects are commonly used in related research (e.g., 
Jayadev, 2007). Our dependent variable is growth of the natural logarithm of private labor 
income share, constructed following Stockhammer’s (2017) approach. The variable 𝐼𝑁𝑉 stands 
for a country’s gross fixed capital formation divided by its GDP, and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 includes the set of 
control variables. As an alternative to using a country’s gross fixed capital formation, we also 
use the part of it which captures only the expenditures on research and development (𝑅&𝐷). 
 
-Table 1 here- 
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In our baseline specification, the vector of control variables 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 includes the ratio of a 
country’s total foreign assets and liabilities to its GDP as a proxy for the degree of international 
financial integration. We also use a country’s total imports and exports relative to its output to 
proxy for the degree of a country’s real integration with the world. To capture the effects of 
economic cycles, we include real GDP growth. We also include trade union density to control 
for workers’ bargaining power, and government consumption for the size of welfare state. We 
also include the human capital index to assess the role of human capital, and, finally, we capture 
the impact of technological change on labor income shares by including the ratio of ICT capital 
as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 provides details about the construction and sources of the data. 
 
-Table 2 here- 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables included in our baseline estimation. 
The sample of our baseline empirical specification includes 52 countries, that we list in Table 
A.1 of the Appendix.2 Our sample spans from 2004 to 2015 when the last data for international 
financial integration are available. The average of the private labor income share is about 43%, 
and this value is significantly lower to the one reported in Stockhammer (2017) who uses data 
from 1970 to 2007. This finding also corroborates evidence for declining wage shares reported 
in several related studies (see inter alia Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014, Stockhammer, 2017 
and Guschanski and Özlem, 2018). The average value of trade openness and government 
expenditure, on the other hand, appears to be much higher than that reported in Stockhammer 
(2017), while that of global financial integration is significantly lower. In Table 3, we report 
the cross-correlations between the variables included in the baseline estimation. All 
                                                 
2 Including the trade union density variable restricts our sample significantly as it is only available for 55 countries.  
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correlations reported are below 0.50, and, thus, our baseline estimation is not likely to face 
issues with multicollinearity.  
 
-Table 3 here- 
 
Starting from the baseline empirical specification, we also investigate if a country’s 
level of income influences the magnitude of the relationship between investment and private 
labor income share. Particularly, we repeat the estimation of equation (1), excluding the union 
density variable in order to increase the sample size, but now we interact the investment 
variable (𝐼𝑁𝑉 or 𝑅&𝐷) with income group dummies that we create based on the ILO’s 
classification. The empirical specification now takes the following form:  
 
 Δ𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑝 = ∑ 𝑎𝑐
4
𝑐=1 × 𝑑𝑐 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡,      (2) 
 
where 𝑑1(2,3,4) is a 0-1 dummy variables taking the value of 1 when ILO classifies a country 
as low- (lower-middle-, upper-middle-, high-) income and zero otherwise.  
 Lastly, we investigate the extent to which investment-labor share relationship varies 
with the degree of a country’s economic freedom. We expect that investment will lead to higher 
growth in labor income shares for countries with higher economic freedom. For robustness 
reasons, we use two alternative proxies for a country’s economic freedom; the index created 
by the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, as well as the Economic Freedom of 
the World index by Frazer Institute. We examine both the direct effects of economic freedom 
on labor income shares and also the effects of its interaction with investment. Particularly, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
 
 9 
 Δ𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑝 = 𝛼1 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1 × 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 × 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡  
+𝛽′𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                    (3) 
 
where variable 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 stands for country’s i index of economic freedom for year t, measured 
either by the index of Heritage Foundation or that of Frazer Institute. To ease the interpretation, 
we standardize the economic freedom indexes to have 0 mean and standard deviation of 1.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS. 
We report the results from the estimation of equation (1) in column (a) of Table 4. All variables 
included in the estimations are in natural logarithms. Before focusing on the effects of 
investment on labor share, we examine the relationship between the rest of the explanatory 
variables and the private labor income share growth. We find that higher foreign assets and 
liabilities as a percentage of GDP are associated with negative changes in private labor income 
shares. This result is consistent with theories supporting a negative relationship between 
globalization and labor income share, and comparable empirical results have been produced by 
Stockhammer (2017) who uses similar proxies for financial globalization. To further explore 
the validity of this finding, and that of the other explanatory variables, we repeat the estimation 
of equation (1), but now we exclude the variable union density. This allows larger sample sizes 
to be used as now several developing countries can be included in our estimations increasing 
the total sample to 99 countries. The strong negative relationship between financial 
globalization and labor share emerges also with the large sample, as we show in column (b) of 
Table 4. 
 
-Table 4 here- 
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The variable trade openness is not statistically significant in the empirical specification 
which includes the union density, but only in the one with the 99 countries, and the estimate 
takes a positive value, albeit only significant at the 10% confidence level. A similar, 
statistically weak, positive relationship is found in Stockhammer (2017) for low income 
countries. A possible explanation for this result is given in IMF (2007) based upon the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem. Based on this explanation, in developing economies trade openness is 
associated with higher wages for the low-skilled workers and lower wages for the high skilled 
workers, reducing this way inequality.  
From the estimation of our baseline specification, we also find a negative relationship 
between technological change and private labor income share, which, however, is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence. In the specification, however, which 
excludes the union density variable, we do not find any statistically significant relationship. 
Moreover, in our baseline specification we find that higher levels of human capital index are 
associated with higher private labor income share. On the contrary, for the larger sample this 
relationship is statistically insignificant, possibly pointing to a differential impact of human 
capital on higher and lower income countries’ labor share.  
Finally, in contrast to most of the previous evidence, we find that government 
consumption affects adversely labor income share. However, this result holds only when we 
consider the sample with the 99 countries which includes more lower income countries. A 
negative relationship between government spending and labor income share is also reported by 
Stockhammer (2017) for the low-income countries. This counterintuitive negative relationship 
could be due to the downward adjustment of employment in response to the welfare state 
expansion, especially when substituting capital for labor is relatively easy (IMF, 2007).   
Turning now to investment-labor share nexus (columns (a) and (b) of Table 4), we find 
that the coefficient estimates of the impact of investment on labor share is positive and highly 
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significant, at least for the baseline specification. This finding suggests that higher capital 
formation increases labor income share. When considering the larger sample, however, the 
coefficient estimate is again positive but only significant at the 10% level of confidence. We 
also examine the effects of countries’ expenses on R&D on their labor income share, and we 
report the results in columns (c) and (d) of Table 4. For the smaller sample of 52 countries, we 
do not find a significant relationship, while when we consider the larger sample, we do find a 
positive relationship. Including the R&D expenses in the specification turns the estimate of 
human capital index statistically insignificant, as expected, since these expenses also include 
expenditures in higher education.  
 
-Table 5- 
 
The model specification in equation (2) links the magnitude of the investment-labor 
share relationship with countries’ level of income. We report the results from this estimation 
in Table 5. In column (a) we report the results for gross fixed capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP, and we find that the size of the positive reaction declines monotonically with 
increasing level of income. Particularly, for the high-income countries the estimate is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence. Additionally, the difference between the 
reaction of high- and low-income countries is statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance. The level of a country’s income, however, does not appear to be a significant 
driver of the magnitude of the relationship between labor income shares and R&D expenses, 
as we show in column (b) of Table 5. Particularly, we find that R&D expenses are equally 
significant for all income groups in our sample, and there is no statistical difference in the 
reaction estimates of the low- and high-income countries. So, for high income countries it is 
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mainly the expenses on research and development that can potentially increase private labor 
income shares and decrease inequality.  
 
-Table 6- 
 
 Finally, in Table 6 we report the results from the estimation of equation (3) which 
examines the role of economic freedom in the relationship between labor income shares and 
investment. In both specifications, with and without the union density variable, and for both 
economic freedom indexes, we find that economic freedom amplifies the positive effect of 
gross fixed capital formation on labor income share, as the interaction terms are positive and 
statistically significant. In the specifications with the union density level, we also find that 
economic freedom is associated with higher labor shares.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we pursue an exploratory empirical exercise on the determinants of the 
functional distribution of income for the period 2004-2015, with a focus on the effects of capital 
formation and R&D expenses. We employ a panel fixed-effects framework to investigate the 
impact that investment and other theoretically motivated control variables have on labor 
income shares for a broad cross-section of countries. We consider a sample of 99 countries, 
which reduces to 52 when we include the trade union membership in our specification, due to 
data availability.  
We find a positive relationship between higher gross fixed capital formation (and R&D 
expenses) as a percentage of GDP and labor income share. This evidence is in line with the 
predictions of the theoretical mechanism for the role of investment in labor share proposed by 
Lawrence (2015). In addition, we find that fixed capital formation has larger distributional 
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effects in lower income countries. R&D expenses, on the other hand, are equally important for 
all countries, regardless of income levels. In addition, we provide evidence showing that the 
labor share enhancing effects of capital formation increase with a country’s degree of economic 
freedom. Economic freedom amplifies the positive effect of gross fixed capital formation on 
labor income shares.
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
Variable Definition 
Investment (𝐼𝑁𝑉) Gross capital formation at current PPPs as a percentage of PPP collected 
from Penn World Tables 9.0.   
Private Labor Share (𝐿𝑆𝑝) Labor income as a percentage of GDP. Data collected from ILO SDG 
labor market indicators [10.4.1]. To obtain private labor income share, 
we use Stockhammer’s (2017) adjustment, described in the main body of 
the text, and remove government consumption (𝐺𝐶) from the total labor 
income share.   
Government consumption (𝐺𝐶) We use the general government final consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP taken from the World Bank collection of development 
indicators.  
Real GDP growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻) We use the real GDP growth (annual percentage rate) collected from the 
IMF-IFS dataset.  
Human Capital Index (𝐻𝐶) The Human Capital Index taken from Penn World Tables 9.0.  
International financial  
integration (𝐹𝐼𝑁)  
We use the sum of a country’s total foreign assets and liabilities as a 
percentage of its GDP using the updated and extended version of dataset 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
Trade openness (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸) The sum of exports of goods and services and imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP taken from the World Bank collection 
of development indicators.    
Union density (𝑈𝐷) Net union membership as a proportion of wage earners in employment. 
Data on union density rate is obtained from Visser (2019) ICTWSS 
dataset. 
ICT capital as a percentage of GDP 
(𝐼𝐶𝑇) 
The share in ICT Capital as a percentage of GDP taken from the 
Conference Board Total Economy Database.  
R&D expenses as a percentage of 
GDP (𝑅&𝐷) 
We use data for research and development expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP collected from the World Bank collection of development 
indicators. The source is UNESCO Institute for Statistics.  
Economic Freedom Index (𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸) We use either the index of economic freedom created by the Heritage 
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal or the Economic Freedom of the 
World index by Frazer Institute.  
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Mean St.Dev p25 median p75 
𝐿𝑆𝑝 43.24 8.96 37.69 43.97 50.05 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 25.47 0.06 21.21 24.66 28.28 
𝐹𝐼𝑁 10.76 37.60 1.55 2.54 5.48 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 103.06 73.44 58.11 79.04 127.92 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 2.96 3.69 1.40 2.85 5 
𝑈𝐷 26.36 18.99 13.4 19.2 32 
𝐺𝐶 17.71 4.22 14.53 18.45 20.25 
𝐻𝐶 3.08 0.44 2.81 3.11 3.43 
𝐼𝐶𝑇 3.82 3.59 2.1 3 4.1 
Notes: The country-year observations in the baseline specification are 503. 
St.Dev. shows the standard deviations of the variables, and p25 and p75 
are the lower and higher quartiles respectively. 𝐿𝑆𝑝 is the private labor 
income share; 𝐼𝑁𝑉 is the gross capital formation at current PPPs as a 
percentage of PPP; 𝐹𝐼𝑁 stands for a country’s international financial 
integration; 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 is a country’s trade openness; 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 is the real 
GDP growth; 𝑈𝐷 is the trade union density from Visser (2019); 𝐺𝐶 is the 
general government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP; 𝐻𝐶 is the human capital index; 𝐼𝐶𝑇 is a country’s ICT capital as a 
percentage of GDP. The description of the variables are given in Table 1.    
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TABLE 3 
CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES 
 𝐿𝑆𝑝 𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝐹𝐼𝑁 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 𝑈𝐷 𝐺𝐶 𝐻𝐶 𝐼𝐶𝑇 
𝐿𝑆𝑝 1         
𝐼𝑁𝑉 .022 1        
𝐹𝐼𝑁 0.03 0.28 1       
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 0.02 0.22 0.47 1      
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 -0.07 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 1     
𝑈𝐷 -0.04 0.15 0.43 0.14 -0.10 1    
𝐺𝐶 -0.04 0.16 0.25 0.11 -0.21 0.45 1   
𝐻𝐶 -0.02 0.20 0.48 0.27 -0.21 0.15 0.34 1  
𝐼𝐶𝑇 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 0.08 0.16 0.01 1 
Notes: This table reports the cross correlation between the variables included in the 
baseline regression.    
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TABLE 4 
BASELINE SPECIFICATION 
 (a) (b)   (c) (d) 
Intercept 
.007 
(0.10) 
-.096 
(-1.25) 
 Intercept 
.070 
(1.56) 
.009*** 
(2.60) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 .030*** 
(2.79) 
.023* 
(1.73) 
 𝑅&𝐷 .003 
(0.80) 
.009** 
(2.60) 
𝐹𝐼𝑁 -.006** 
(-2.12) 
-.008*** 
(-3.06) 
 𝐹𝐼𝑁 -.005** 
(-2.11) 
-.008*** 
(-2.65) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 .001 
(0.31) 
.010* 
(1.72) 
 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 .002 
(0.49) 
.007 
(1.50) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 -.003 
(-1.43) 
-.004* 
(-1.94) 
 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 -.002 
(-0.94) 
-.001 
(-0.40) 
𝑈𝐷 .002 
(0.43) 
-  𝑈𝐷 .001 
(0.16) 
- 
𝐺𝐶 -.001 
(-0.06) 
-.022* 
(-1.80) 
 𝐺𝐶 -.006 
(-0.50) 
-.029** 
(-1.97) 
𝐻𝐶 .007** 
(1.96) 
.007 
(1.58) 
 𝐻𝐶 .003 
(0.64) 
.006 
(1.37) 
𝐼𝐶𝑇 -.005* 
(-1.86) 
.004 
(1.09) 
 𝐼𝐶𝑇 -.008*** 
(-2.57) 
-.001 
(-0.49) 
𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡=0
𝑝
 -.034*** 
(-2.84) 
-.015* 
(-0.70) 
 𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝜏=0
𝑝
 -.028** 
(-2.25) 
-.007 
(-0.89) 
Countries/Obs. 52/503 99/1,076  Countries/Obs. 52/468 88/756 
R2(%) 13.14% 3.96%  R2(%) 10.44% 4.93% 
Notes: This table shows the results from the estimation of equation (1). All variables are included in 
natural logarithms. All estimations include time-fixed effects. The description of the variables 
included in the estimations are given in Table 1. */**/***denote significance at 90%/95%/99% 
confidence levels.  
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TABLE 5 
THE ROLE OF COUNTRIES’ LEVEL OF INCOME 
 (a)   (b) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 × 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤  .041** 
(2.29) 
 
𝑅&𝐷 × 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤  
.014** 
(2.48) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 × 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤−𝑚𝑖𝑑 .037** 
(2.21) 
 
𝑅&𝐷 × 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤−𝑚𝑖𝑑  
.010** 
(2.36) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 × 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝−𝑚𝑖𝑑 .034** 
(2.10) 
 
𝑅&𝐷 × 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝−𝑚𝑖𝑑  
.009** 
(2.37) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 × 𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  .025* 
(1.84) 
 
𝑅&𝐷 × 𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  
.009*** 
(2.66) 
𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ −  𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤 2.98* 
 
𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ −  𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤  1.68 
[p-value] 
[0.08] 
 
[p-value] [0.19] 
Control variables 
Yes 
 
Control variables Yes 
Intercept -.104 
(-1.37) 
 Intercept 
-.117** 
(-2.04) 
Countries/Obs. 
99/1,076 
 
Countries/Obs. 88/756 
R2(%) 
4.26% 
 
R2(%) 5.03% 
Notes: This table shows the results from the estimation of equation (2) in the 
main body of the text. 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑤−𝑚𝑖𝑑, 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑝−𝑚𝑖𝑑 , and 𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ  are 0-1 dummy 
variables taking the value of 1 for low-, lower-middle-, upper-middle-, and 
high-income countries and zero otherwise. Control variables in the estimations 
are 𝐹𝐼𝑁, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻, 𝐺𝐶, 𝐻𝐶, 𝐼𝐶𝑇 and 𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡=0
𝑝
. We use the ILO’s 
classification to identify the income level of a country. All variables, except for 
the dummy variables, are included in natural logarithms. The description of the 
variables included in the estimations are given in Table 1. */**/***denote 
significance at 90%/95%/99% confidence levels. 
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 TABLE 6 
THE ROLE OF COUNTRIES’ LEVEL OF ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM 
 Heritage Foundation  Fraser Institute 
 (a) (b)  (c) (d) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 .018 
(1.20) 
.020*** 
(2.70) 
 .020 
(1.27) 
.019** 
(1.96) 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸 .038** 
(2.38) 
.022 
(1.27) 
 .048** 
(2.37) 
.036*** 
(2.62) 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 × 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸 .027** 
(2.28) 
.019* 
(1.94) 
 .036*** 
(2.89) 
.025*** 
(2.83) 
Control variables 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Intercept -.035 
(-1.09) 
-.037 
(-1.09) 
 .029 
(0.40) 
-.136*** 
(-3.21) 
Countries/Obs. 
49/474 83/902 
 
49/471 86/921 
R2(%) 
13.29% 5.44% 
 
14.11% 7.82% 
Notes: This table shows the results from the estimation of equation (3) in the main 
body of the text. The variable 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐸 measures a country’s degree of economic 
freedom measured either by the index of the Heritage Foundation or that of the Fraser 
Institute, and is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The 
specifications in columns (a) and (c) include the union density (𝑈𝐷) variable, while 
those reported in columns (b) and (d) not. Both indexes of economic freedom are not 
available for all countries for the 2004-2015 period, and, thus, the sample size is 
different to the one employed for the estimations in Table 4. The rest of the control 
variables in the estimations are 𝐹𝐼𝑁, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻, 𝐺𝐶, 𝐻𝐶, 𝐼𝐶𝑇 and 𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡=0
𝑝
. 
All variables, except for the dummy variables, are included in natural logarithms. 
The description of the variables included in the estimations are given in Table 1. 
*/**/***denote significance at 90%/95%/99% confidence levels. 
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Appendix 
TABLE A.1 
Countries in our sample 
The group of 52 countries includes:  The group of 99 countries also 
includes: 
Argentina 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Hong Kong 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
South Korea 
Romania 
Russia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden  
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Armenia 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Bolivia 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Iran 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Qatar 
Moldova 
Saudi Arabia 
Serbia 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
